China has approved the construction of the world’s largest dam at the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra as it turns south into Arunachal Pradesh, posing a range of security, ecological and livelihood concerns for India. The proposed 60 GW dam, situated just 30 km away from the Indian border and generating 300 billion kwh of power annually could be what security observers call a ‘water bomb’, allowing the upper riparian country to alter the flow of water at will.

China contends that India and other riparian countries in the basin, namely, Bangladesh and Bhutan, have little to worry over flows in a run of the river project. This is not convincing, precisely because China holds the ‘tap’, as it were. It is just as baseless to argue that India has little to fear because the Brahmaputra swells only on the Indian side which receives copious rainfall besides being fed by two tributaries. Even if the Tibet-China stretch contributes less than 30 per cent of the water flows, there could be variations in times of climate extremes, as well as differences between flows in dry months and the May to October period. The absence of an institutional arrangement to share information and water could prove disastrous. India should be alert to a gamut of possible consequences, as erratic flows could impact farming, fishing and soil quality. There is also the threat of severe quakes in a region that is prone to it.

Even if these dangers are discounted, the project should be opposed for violating India’s rights as a lower riparian country. Any transnational water body is a regional public good, and its management must be driven by a river basin approach. Successful water sharing agreements based on this principle have stood the test of time, be it in Ecuador-Peru, the Great Lakes in North America, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) or the Indus Water Treaty. India has registered its protest at not being informed about China’s decision, but that’s not enough. It must develop an institutional approach, based on global precedents, to enforce its water rights. It is surprising that no effort has been made over the years to arrive at an accord on rights and obligations, involving Bangladesh and Bhutan. A transactional arrangement whereby India pays for water flows data between May and October is not even a poor substitute. Even here, China does not always adhere to its side of the bargain, as in 2017. While MRC is far from perfect, it has created a framework for dialogue over livelihood and other issues. The lower riparian countries (less mighty than India) appear to have access to dry season flows or the right to inspect China’s dam sites. India should be more assertive, having played to the rules with respect to its Indus Waters Treaty, 1960, with Pakistan.

It should institutionalise its water ties with China, bringing a wider agenda to the negotiation table and involving neighbourhood governments, including the north-eastern States. The Yarlung Zangpo dam can be resisted.